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We show that adaptive batch normalization (BN) technique that involves re-
estimating the BN parameters during inference, can significantly improve the
robustness of adversarially trained models for any random perturbations, including
the Gaussian noise. This simple finding enables us to transform an adversarially
trained model into a randomized smoothing classifier to provide certified robustness
for `2 norm. Moreover, we achieve `2 certified robustness even for adversarially
trained models, learned using `∞-bounded adversaries. Further, adaptive BN signif-
icantly improves robustness against common corruptions, without any detrimental
effect on their performance against adversarial attacks. This enables us to achieve
both adversarial and corruption robustness using the same classifier.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural network (DNN) based models perform poorly in adverse real-world conditions when
the test examples are obtained from a different distribution as the training examples. Recent studies
have shown that a DNN classifier that correctly classifies an image x, can be easily fooled by an
adversarial attack to misclassify x+ δ, where, δ is a minor adversarial perturbation such that the
changes between x and x+δ remain indistinguishable to the human eye (Szegedy et al., 2014). Further,
DNN classifiers are also found to be sensitive to naturally occurred random corruptions(Hendrycks
& Dietterich, 2019). Hence, building a robust classifier against both adversarial perturbations and
common corruptions has emerged as an important research direction to enhance the reliability for
sensitive real-world applications (Gilmer et al., 2019).
Among the successful defense mechanisms against adversarial attacks, adversarial training achieves
the best empirical robustness performance for a specific perturbation type (such as a small `p-noise)
by training on adversarial examples of the same perturbation types (Madry et al., 2018; Tramèr &
Boneh, 2019). While recently, a number of certification techniques is proposed for this frameworks
to verify if the prediction of the test examples x remain constant within its neighborhood (Wong &
Kolter, 2018; Wang et al., 2018), they typically do not scale for large networks (e.g., ResNet50) and
datasets (e.g., IMAGENET). In contrast, the randomized smoothing technique provides a scalable
`2-norm certification for any classification model that is robust against standard isotropic Gaussian
noise (Cohen et al., 2019). However, this certification technique cannot be applied for adversarially
trained models as they are not robust against Gaussian noise. Further, Gilmer et al. (2019) recently
demonstrated a close relation between adversarial robustness and corruption robustness. However, in
practice adversarially trained models often lead to poor performance even compared to the standard
DNN based models when exposed to naturally occurring common corruptions, (e.g., IMAGENET-C
(Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019)), limiting the practical purview of them. Hence, it raises the question
of whether adversarially trained models can be used for sensitive real-world applications?
Existing adversarially trained models typically perform inference on test examples independently
from each other. This standard inference setup often underestimates their robustness in non-IID
settings. For example, the distribution of test examples may change in the medical imaging settings,
as we use a different data acquisition system or in autonomous cars, satellite image analysis as the
weather condition changes. However, these external conditions do not change abruptly for most (but
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not all) of the real-world applications. Hence, we can expect to receive potentially a large number of
test examples from the same distribution during inference.
Unsupervised adaptation mechanisms are well studied in the field of domain adaptation (DA), where
the aim is to modulate the model parameters for a different target domain (Li et al., 2016). Recent
works have explored self-supervised training (Sun et al., 2020), batch normalization (BN) adaptation
(Schneider et al., 2020; Nado et al., 2020) using test batches to improve the robustness against
common corruptions for standard classifiers. In this paper, we investigate adapting BN statistics for
adversarially trained models for both adversarial and common corruption robustness. In the standard
inference setup, BN statistics of the DNN models are estimated during training and used without
re-estimation for the test examples. However, activation statistics obtained during training time do
not reflect the statistics of the test examples under covariate shifts. Here we apply adaptive BN, i.e.,
re-estimate the BN statistics using the test images to mitigate such covariate shifts (Li et al., 2016).
The contributions of our paper are as follows: We first demonstrate that this simple adaptation
alone greatly improves the overall robustness of the adversarially trained models against Gaussian
noise. This simple finding allows us to transform them into a smoothed classifier to provide certified
robustness in `2 norm without degrading their empirical robustness against adversarial attacks.
Hence, we can provide test-time flexibility to obtain empirically robust predictions and also verify
whether we can certify the prediction for sensitive real-world applications. Further, we show that
adversarially trained models with adaptive BN significantly improves the performance against
common perturbations and mitigates the performance gap between common corruption images and
clean images, improving the generalization for real-world image classification tasks. To the best of
our knowledge, existing frameworks only provide either empirical adversarial robustness (Madry
et al., 2018; Rice et al., 2020; Nandy et al., 2020) or certified robustness (Cohen et al., 2019; Salman
et al., 2019), or corruption robustness (Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019; Sun et al., 2020). In contrast,
our proposed framework of using adaptive BN at test-time on adversarially trained models offers all
of these three benefits without any additional training and architectural overhead.
2 ADAPTIVE BATCH-NORMALIZATION
Using BN statistics from the training dataset generalizes well in the standard IID settings (Ioffe &
Szegedy, 2015). However, in non-IID settings, the changes in the test distribution lead to different
activation statistics for the test examples. Hence, impacted by covariate shift, the statistics estimated
using the training batches cannot effectively normalize the activation tensors, breaking the crucial
assumption for the subsequent hidden layers to work.
More formally, let x ∈ X are inputs and y ∈ Y are the class labels. We denote the training
distribution as PT : X × Y → R+ and test distribution as Pt : X × Y → R+. Then, there exists
covariate shift between training and test distribution if: PT (y|x)=Pt(y|x) and PT (x) 6= Pt(x).
Further, if the covariate shift only leads to change in the first and second order moments of the feature
activations fh(x), we can remove it by re-estimating these statistics using the test batches, followed











We can remove the effect of covariate shift by correcting first and second-order moments as long
as the change in the test distribution only leads the feature activations to scale and translate. In the
context of domain adaptation (Li et al., 2016) and corruption robustness (Nado et al., 2020; Schneider
et al., 2020), adaptive BN to correct the BN statistics are found to be effective as long as the semantics
in the test images does not change.
Adaptive BN adapts the BN statistics using the unlabelled test batches in an unsupervised fashion.
Given a set of test examples, we compute the BN statistics using the feature activations of the test
batch, denoted as µt, s2t and adapt them with the existing statistics, µT , s
2
T that are already obtained
using the training batches as: µ = ρ ·µt + (1− ρ) ·µT ; s = ρ · st + (1− ρ) · sT ; where, ρ ∈ [0, 1]
is the momentum. The choice of ρ = 0 rejects the statistics of the test examples. This is equivalent
to the deterministic DNN classifier in the standard inference setup. In contrast, ρ = 1 completely
ignores the pre-calculated statistics from the training batches. As we receive a larger test batch, we
can get a better estimate of the test distribution. Hence, we should choose a larger value for ρ. In
contrast, if the test-batch size is too small, the estimated statistics would be unreliable.
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3 EXPERIMENTS
We present four sets of experiments on IMAGENET (Deng et al., 2009) with ResNet50 (He et al.,
2016a;b). The adversarially trained models, Adv∞ and Adv2 are learned using `∞ ≤ 4/255 and
`2 ≤ 3 threat models with early stopping criteria (Rice et al., 2020). We compare with Baseline and
Randσ=0.5 that are respectively trained using clean images and by augmenting random Gaussian
noise, sampled from N (0, σ2I) with σ = 0.5. See Appendix B for more details.
Model σ = 0 σ = 0.25 σ = 0.5 σ = 0.75
Baseline 75.2±0.0 11.8±0.22 0.3±0.01 0.1±0.0
+ adaptive BN 74.4±0.04 31.0±0.27 7.7±0.24 2.4±0.01
Adv∞ 62.8±0.0 3.9±0.03 0.4±0.01 0.2±0.01
+ adaptive BN 60.8±0.16 53.4±0.15 44.9±0.08 33.7±0.28
Adv2 59.8±0.0 9.8±0.08 0.9±0.01 0.3±0.0
+ adaptive BN 58.3±0.08 53.7±0.14 47.3±0.14 39.8±0.18
Rand σ=0.5 22.0±0.0 32.8±0.11 60.9±0.04 0.9±0.06
+ adaptive BN 62.7±0.03 62.3±0.18 59.5±0.11 51.4±0.27
Table 1: Effect of adaptive BN on Top-1 accu-
racy under Gaussian noises. We randomly shuf-
fle the test set and sample the noises to report
(mean ± 2× sd) of 5 different runs.
Robustness against Gaussian Noise. In Table 1, we
present the performance of different models at different
levels of Gaussian augmented noises. We observe that
when the test images are sampled from IID settings
(i.e., σ = 0 for Baseline, Adv∞, and Adv2 and σ = 0.5
for Randσ=0.5), the performance of different models
remain similar regardless of whether BN adaptation is
used. However, as we move away from the IID set-
tings by increasing (or decreasing) σ, the performance
of these models significantly degrades in the standard
inference setup. In contrast, by applying adaptive BN,
we can improve the performance of all classifiers. In
particular, Adv∞ and Adv2 achieve significantly higher improvements by applying adaptive BN. We
visualize the loss gradients to further investigate the effect of the adaptive BN in Appendix C.
`2 Certification for Adversarially Trained Models. A classifier, f that achieves robustness
against standard Gaussian noise, can be transformed into a smoothed classifier, g to provide certified
robustness against `2-norm Cohen et al. (2019). For an input x, g(x) labels x as class y that the base
classifier is most likely to return under noisy corruption x + δ s.t.: g(x) = argmaxy∈Y P(f(x +
δ) == y) where, Y is the set of class labels and δ ∼ N (0, σ2I). Since modulating BN statistics
using adaptive BN technique significantly improves robustness against Gaussian noise for both Adv2
and Adv∞, we can transform both of these models into a smoothed classifier to provide robustness
certification for `2 norm.
















Baseline (at = 0.25)
Adv   (at = 0.25)
Adv + adaptive BN (at = 0.5)
Adv2  (at = 0.25)
Adv2+ adaptive BN (at = 0.5)
Rand = 0.5 (Cohen at al., 2019)
Figure 1: Certified accuracy at `2 radii.
Here, we first modulate the BN statistics of the classifiers us-
ing adaptive BN by feeding the Gaussian noise augmented
test batches. The noises are sampled from the same isotropic
Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2I) as we use for certification.
We then freeze the parameters for the whole certification pro-
cess. That is, the base classifier f remains the same for the
process. Here, we use σ = 0.5 for Adv∞ and Adv2 models
with BN adaptation. We use σ = 0.25 for the Baseline, Adv∞
and Adv2 models without BN adaption that are not robust
against Gaussian noises (see Table 1). We also compare with
the certification result of the standard randomized smoothing
classifiers using Randσ=0.5 at σ = 0.5 as proposed in (Cohen et al., 2019). We use a subsampled
IMAGENET test set of 500 samples, as in (Cohen et al., 2019) and certify them with 99.9% probability.
We can see in Figure 1, that both Adv∞ and Adv2 models can be transformed using adaptive BN
technique to provide certified robustness for `2 norm. Adv2 models consistently achieve better
performance compared to Adv∞ in terms of certified accuracy. Further, Adv2 produces similar
certification as Randσ=0.5 beyond `2-radii of 1.0 and outperforms Randσ=0.5 beyond `2-radii of 1.5.
Finally, we note that there exists improved randomized smoothing models (e.g., (Salman et al., 2019))
for superior robustness certification. However, they perform poorly against adversarial attacks or
commonly occurring random perturbations, unlike our proposed framework.
Model Threat Model w/o adapt. BN with adapt. BN Diff
Adv∞ ||δ||∞ ≤ 4/255 34.2 41.1±1.14 +6.9
Adv2 ||δ||2 ≤ 3.0 35.4 37.0±0.37 +1.6
Table 2: Performance under adversarial attacks. For
models with BN adaptation, we randomly shuffle the test
images to report (mean+ 2× sd) of 3 different runs.
Under adversarial attacks. Adversarially
trained models provide the best empirical de-
fense against adversarial attacks. Hence, we do
not need to transform them into smoothed classi-
fiers for practical use. This section evaluates the
empirical performance of adversarially trained
models as we apply the adaptive BN technique.
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We use PGD attack with 100 iterations to evaluate the models without adaptive BN Madry et al.
(2018). However, as we apply adaptive BN during inference, the BN parameters consistently change
to accommodate the inputs at each forward pass. For this, we choose a set of m = 10 classifiers
by applying adaptive BN technique on the original adversarially trained model using a test batch,
perturbed with randomly chosen δ ∈ ∆ from the threat model (as a proxy for the adversarial
perturbations). The adversarial examples are then produced using expectation over transformation
(EoT) technique (Athalye et al., 2017; 2018). We present the results on a subset of 2000 images
test examples. In Table 2, we observe a consistent improvement for the models using adaptive BN.
To summarize, adaptive BN often improves performance against adversarial attacks without any
detrimental effect. See Appendix E for additional details.
Under Common Corruptions. Hendrycks & Dietterich (2019) introduced IMAGENET-C by
algorithmically generated corruptions from noise, blur, weather, or digital categories with 5 different
severities for each corruptions. While adversarially trained models are effective against adversarial
attacks, they often perform poorly against such common corruptions, even compared to the standard
DNN models in the standard inference setup (Hendrycks et al., 2020; Gilmer et al., 2019). Here, we
demonstrate that by applying the adaptive BN technique, we can greatly improve their performance.
The corruption robustness of a classifier, f is typically measured using the mean corruption error
(mCE) (Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019). It is computed by normalizing the model’s top-1 errors with
the top-1 errors of AlexNet (Krizhevsky et al., 2012) across the set of corruptions, K and corruption










; where, errfk,i and err
Alex
k,i denotes the top-1 error
for corruption type k at severity i for f and the AlexNet model respectively.
Top-1 Accuracy mCE relative-mCE






adapt. BN (↓)Clean (↑) Corrupt (↑) Gaps (↓) Clean (↑) Corrupt (↑) Gaps (↓)
Baseline 75.2±0.0 39.0±0.0 36.2 74.4±0.14 49.0±0.01 25.4 77.0±0.0 64.3±0.01 103.3±0.0 70.8±0.45
Adv∞ 62.8±0.0 32.2±0.0 30.6 60.8±0.16 51.7±0.02 9.1 85.2±0.0 61.9±0.03 81.0±0.0 25.3±0.59
Adv2 59.8±0.0 31.3±0.0 28.5 58.3±0.08 50.3±0.02 8.0 86.5±0.0 63.9±0.03 75.7±0.0 22.6±0.28
Table 3: Effect of adaptive BN on adversarially trained models against corruption images. For models with BN
adaptation, we randomly shuffle the test images to report (mean+ 2× sd) of 3 different runs. For each column,
down-arrow (↓) denotes the lower values are better and up-arrow (↑) denotes the higher values are better.
However, mCE does not reflect the generalization gap between clean test images and the corruption
images. For example, a classifier may withstand the corruption images, minimizing the generalization
gaps from clean test images. However, it may produce a higher mCE compared to a classifier with a
low clean error rate while the error rate spike in the presence of corruption. Hence, (Hendrycks & Di-
etterich, 2019) proposed another metric, called relative mean corruption error (rmCE). It computes
a normalized relative change of top-1 error rate of the classifier, f from the clean error rate across dif-















where, errfClean and err
Alex
Clean denote the clean error rate for f and the AlexNet model respectively.
Since adversarially trained models already produce a high error rate for the clean test images to
achieve adversarial robustness, rmCE is a more appropriate metric for comparison.
In Table 3, we note that adversarially trained models already achieve lower rmCE scores. Further,
by applying the adaptive BN technique, these models significantly reduce rmCE scores, leading to a
better classification generalization. We also see that adaptive BN significantly reduces the gap in top-1
accuracy between clean and corrupted test images for adversarially trained models. In Appendix F.1,
we also presents additional results.
4 CONCLUSION
We demonstrate that the test-time adaptive BN technique for adversarially trained models allows
us to produce robustness certification and significantly improves the robustness against common
corruptions without degrading their performance against adversarial attacks. These experimental
findings allow us to obtain robust predictions as well as verify whether we can certify the prediction
for sensitive real-world applications.
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A APPENDIX ORGANIZATION
We organize the appendix as follows:
• Section B presents the implementation details of training for our experiments and the hyper-parameter
settings for adaptive BN technique during inference.
• Section C visualizes the loss gradients of adversarially trained models with and without BN adaptation
as we augment Gaussian noise to the test images.
• Section D presents two additional experiments for `2 certification.
• Section E provides additional ablation studies on the adversarial attacks.
• Section F presents additional results on corruption robustness.
B EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we first present the implementation details for training the classification models. Next, we discuss
the choice of test-time hyper-parameter settings for using the adaptive batch-normalization (BN) technique.
B.1 IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We present our experiments on IMAGENET Deng et al. (2009) dataset. We use ResNet50 models for IMAGENET
He et al. (2016a). For Baseline and Randσ=0.5 models, we obtain the weights from Cohen et al. (2019)1 that
are trained using Gaussian augmented noises, sampled from isotropic Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2I) with
σ = 0.0 (i.e., no noise) and σ = 0.5 respectively.
Here, the adversarially trained models i.e., Adv∞ and Adv2 are learned for `∞ and `2 threat models with threat
boundary of 4/255 and 3, respectively. We use the models provided by Rice et al. (2020) 2, which in turn is
adopted from PGD-based adversarial training of the models provided by Engstrom et al. (2019) 3.
We resize the input images to 256×265 pixels and crop 224×224 pixels from the middle. Note that, ImageNet-
C images are provided after resizing and cropping. So, we do not change those images. For our experiments on
certification, we use a subsample of 500 test images by choosing at most 1 sample for each class. Also, we use a
subsample of 2, 000 test images, with exactly 2 samples per class, for our experiments on the adversarial attack.
ρ 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0
Adv∞ 0.4±0.01 2.1±0.04 20.6±0.16 41.1±0.09 43.5±0.14 44.2±0.12 44.8±0.13
Adv2 0.9±0.01 7.7±0.09 36.6±0.09 45.5±0.13 46.7±0.13 46.8±0.13 47.2±0.14
Table 4: Top-1 accuracy using fixed test batch-size = 512 for adversarially trained models under
Gaussian augmented noise with σ = 0.5 for different choices of momentum, ρ during inference. We
randomly shuffle the test images and randomly sampled Gaussian noises to report (mean+ 2× sd)
of 5 different runs. ρ = 0 indicates the performance of models without BN adaptation.
Batch Size - 8 16 32 64 128 256 512
Adv∞ 0.4±0.01 11.5±0.22 28.1±0.22 37.1±0.24 41.4±0.26 43.3±0.15 44.4±0.21 44.8±0.13
Adv2 0.9±0.01 9.1±0.15 26.7±0.14 37.6±0.2 42.9±0.12 45.4±0.13 46.7±0.07 47.2±0.14
Table 5: Top-1 accuracy using fixed ρ = 1 for adversarially trained models under Gaussian augmented
noise with σ = 0.5 for different sizes of test batches during inference. We randomly shuffle the test
images to report (mean+ 2× s.d.) of 5 different runs. ‘-’ denotes the performance without any BN
adaptation.
B.2 CHOICE OF HYPER-PARAMETERS
During inference, adaptive BN technique is controlled using two hyper-parameters, i.e., the test batch-size and
momentum, ρ to update the statistics of the batch-normalization layers. We assume that the images in the test
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(a) σ = 0 (Clean) (b) σ = 0.25 (c) σ = 0.5 (d) σ = 0.75
Figure 2: Visualization of loss-gradient images produced by adversarially trained classifiers as we
apply different levels of Gaussian noises in the test images.
to these images. The hyper-parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1] controls the tread-off between existing training statistics and
test statistics for updating the parameters. When a larger size of the test batch is available, we can get a better
estimation of the test distribution. Hence, we can choose a larger value of ρ. However, the choice of test batch
size is constrained by different factors in practice, such as available hardware resources.
Here, we analyze the effects of these hyper-parameters for adversarially trained models using adaptive BN
technique during inference. For different choices, we compare the top-1 test accuracy under Gaussian augmented
noise using σ = 0.5, to find the appropriate ρ and the batch size. Since, the standard DNN classifier (i.e.,
Baseline) does not improve robustness under Gaussian noise at σ = 0.5 even after BN adaptation, we skip those
models from our following analysis. Also, we refer to the previous work in Schneider et al. (2020); Nado et al.
(2020) that analyzed the effects of these hyper-parameters for the standard DNN classifiers.
Momentum, ρ. We first investigate the effect of momentum, ρ as we choose a large batch size of 512. In
Table 4, we present the performance of adversarially trained models as we choose different values of ρ. Recall
that, ρ = 1 denotes full-adaptation. Here, we completely ignore the existing statistics, computed during training
and use the test statistics. In contrast, ρ = 0 represents no-adaptation, where we completely ignore the test
statistics. This leads to the standard deterministic classification model.
As we can see in Table 4, the performance of these classifiers started improving even ρ = 0.7 as we slightly
modulate the BN statistics using that test batches. Further, the performance started improving significantly as we
choose larger ρ to rely more on the current test batches. We observe that the performance started converging at
ρ = 0.7.
Batch Size. Next, we investigate the minimum size of the test batches that would allow us to use ρ = 1
(i.e., full-adaptation). In Table 5, we fix ρ = 1 and vary the test batch sizes as we evaluate the models. We
observe that the performance of the models started improving even when we are using the test batches of size 8.
The performance improves as we choose larger sizes of test batches. We can see that their performance started
converging as we choose a batch size of 64.
C VISUALIZATION OF LOSS GRADIENTS
In Table 1, we observe that adversarially trained models achieve significantly higher improvements by applying
adaptive BN. For example, at σ = 0.5, these models respectively achieve 0.3%, 0.4%, and 0.9% top-1 accuracy
for IMAGENET dataset (Table 1). By using adaptive BN technique, Adv2 and Adv∞ improves the top-1 accuracy
to 44.9%, 47.3%, i.e., minimizing the performance gaps between clean test images and noisy images at σ = 0.5
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from 62.4% and 58.9% to only 15.9% and 11.0% respectively. In contrast, after correcting the BN statistics,
the Baseline achieves 7.7% top-1 accuracy, only slightly reducing the performance gaps from 74.9% to 66.7%.
To investigate the effect of adaptive BN technique for adversarially trained models, we visualize the loss gradients
for individual pixels of an image as we increase the Gaussian noise, i.e., σ (see Figure 2). Loss-gradients reflect
the most important input pixels that strongly affect the prediction of a classifier. We scale, translate and clip the
loss-gradient values for visualization, without using any complex processing techniques. For clean test images
(i.e., at σ = 0), gradients for adversarially trained models align properly with perceptually relevant features,
irrespective of whether BN adaptation is used Tsipras et al. (2019); Etmann et al. (2019). The effect of adaptive
BN becomes prominent as σ is increased. We can see that the overall loss gradient tends to become noisier as
we increase the noise level to σ=0.5 and σ=0.75 However, the models without BN adaptation lead to produce
sharper loss gradients (i.e., providing higher importance) even for background pixels. In contrast, models with
BN adaptation produce sharper loss gradients for the pixels from the object of interest while suppressing the
background pixels. Hence, the classifier is made available with required semantic information for classification.
It is interesting to note that Adv2 produces significantly more human-aligned loss gradients compared to Adv∞
at σ=0.75. This behaviour is also reflected in their classification as we can see that Adv∞ achieves 33.7% top-1
accuracy at σ=0.75 while Adv2 achieves 39.8% (see Table 1).
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Figure 3: IMAGENET: Certified top-1 accuracy at various `2 radii as we vary σ for BN adaptation
and certification for the same classification model. Adaptive BN allows to choose different values
of optimum σ for certifying different test examples. By selecting those optimum σ for each test
example, we can obtain an upper envelope of these curves as our certified top-1 accuracy.
IMAGENET
`2 Radius 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5 1.75 2.0 2.25 2.5 2.75
Adv∞ + adapt BN (at σ = 0.25) 50.0 46.4 41.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Adv∞ + adapt BN (at σ = 0.50) 43.6 39.4 35.8 31.4 27.6 23.4 18.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Adv∞ + adapt BN (at σ = 0.75) 31.6 26.4 22.4 18.6 16.8 14.4 11.8 9.4 7.6 5.6 3.6
Adv2 + adapt BN (at σ = 0.25) 53.2 50.2 46.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Adv2 + adapt BN (at σ = 0.50) 47.0 43.0 39.0 36.4 32.8 30.8 27.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Adv2 + adapt BN (at σ = 0.75) 37.8 32.2 28.4 26.0 22.4 20.2 19.0 17.4 14.2 12.0 9.6
Table 6: IMAGENET: Certified top-1 accuracy at various `2 radii as we vary σ for BN adaptation and
certification for the same classification model. We use ResNet50 for IMAGENET.
D FLEXIBILITY OF CHOOSING σ DURING INFERENCE FOR CERTIFICATION
USING BN ADAPTATION
The choice of σ controls the tread-off between certified robust accuracy and certification boundary (Cohen et al.,
2019; Salman et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019). When σ is small, we can certify smaller radii with high accuracy.
However, we cannot certify for large `2 radii at all. In contrast, as we choose a higher value for σ, larger radii
can be certified, but we get a lower certification accuracy at `2 radii.
However, existing works require fixing an appropriate value of σ during training to learn their base classifier
(Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019). In contrast, the adaptive BN technique provides the flexibility to
choose an appropriate σ during inference. In other words, we can choose different values of σ for different test
examples for the certification process. However, this process of choosing an appropriate value of σ for different
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adapt BN With adaptive BN
m=1 m=5 m=10
Adv∞ ||δ||∞ ≤ 8/255 34.2 41.5±1.79 41.4±2.55 41.1±1.14
Adv2 ||δ||2 ≤ 1 35.4 37.7±0.82 37.0±0.37 37.0±0.3
Table 7: IMAGENET: Performance under adversarial attacks as we vary the number of models (m)
to approximate the loss gradients for the adversarial attack. For models with BN adaptation, we
randomly shuffle the test images to report (mean+ 2× sd) of 3 different runs.
test examples for certification is extremely expensive. For each example, it would require applying the BN
adaptation on the classifier and find the certification boundaries different values of σ followed by choosing the
largest `2 certification boundary.
Here, we choose three different values σ i.e., {0.25, 0.5, 0.75} for our experiments. Figure 3 and Table 6
presents the results. We estimate the class label probabilities using Monte-Carlo sampling with 100, 000 noisy
samples and certify the test examples with 99.9% probability. We use the same Adv∞ and Adv2 models as
described in Section B. Note that, by choosing the appropriate values of σ for the certification process, we can
get the upper envelopes of these curves as our certified top-1 accuracy in Figure 3 for IMAGENET.
E ADDITIONAL RESULTS UNDER ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
In this section, we first present the EoT algorithm that we use to generate adversarial attack images. Next, we
compare the strength of our adaptive attack as we increase the number of models to approximate the gradients.
E.1 ADVERSARIAL ATTACK IMAGE GENERATION
For a test image, x with label y, the goal of an adversarial attack is to find perturbation δ within a chosen
perturbation ε for an `p norm such that:
max
δ∈∆
L(fθ(x+ δ), y) where ∆ = {δ : ||δ||p ≤ ε} (1)
We use projected gradient descent (PGD) attack (Kurakin et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2018) to evaluate Adv∞ and
Adv2 models in the standard inference setup (i.e., without using adaptive BN). Starting with a random initial
perturbation δ(0), PGD attack iteratively adjusts the perturbation following the gradient steps with step-size η
and projects back onto the `p threat model:
δ̃ = δ(t) + η ·Qp(∇δL(fθ(x+ δ(t)), y))
δ(t+1) = max(min(δ̃, ε),−ε)
(2)
For `∞, we use the sign of the gradient i.e., Qp(z) = sign(z). For other norms such as `2, we normalize the
gradient as: Qp(z) = z/||z||2.
In contrast to the standard inference setup, adaptive BN during inference consistently changes the BN param-
eters, accommodating the inputs at each forward pass. Hence, we cannot effectively compute the gradients,
∇δL(fθ(x + δ), y), to produce the most effective adversarial examples. Here, we instead apply expectation
over transformation (EoT) technique to approximate the gradient (Athalye et al., 2017). For cross-entropy loss,
we can write the loss as: ∇δL(fθ(x+ δ), y) = ∇δ(− log(fθ(x+ δ)y)). To apply EoT, we select a set of m
models with varying BN statistics and approximate the gradient as:








i=1 are the classifiers with different BN parameters.
Each fθ(i) are obtained by applying adaptive BN technique on the original classifier fθ using test batch, perturbed
with randomly chosen δ ∈ ∆ from the threat model (as a proxy of the adversarial perturbations). Notably, We
place log outside of the expectation as it was found to be more effective (Salman et al., 2019).
We use the same threat boundaries for attacks as used during the adversarial training. That is, we use ||δ||∞ ≤ 4255
and ||δ||2 ≤ 3 for Adv∞ and Adv2 models respectively. The adversarial examples are generated using 100
iterations.
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E.2 EFFECT OF THE EOT HYPER-PARAMETER (m)
We recall from Equation 3 that for adversarially trained models with BN adaptation, we need to approximate the
gradients during back-propagation at each step of the adaptive adversarial attack using Equation 3. We select a
set of m different classifiers, {fθ(i)}
m
i=1 with different BN parameters for this approximation. We obtain each
fθ(i) by applying adaptive BN technique on the original classifier fθ using test batch, perturbed with randomly
chosen δ ∈ ∆ from the threat model. For our experiments in Table 2, we choose m = 10.
Here, we compare the strength of our adaptive attack as we vary the number of models (i.e., m) to approximate
the gradients. Table 7 present the results. We observe that the performance of the adversarial attacks does not
change significantly as we vary m to approximate the gradients. This is because we obtain a set of classifier
{fθ(i)}
m
i=1 by applying adaptive BN technique on the original classifier fθ using a large test batch-size of 500
images, perturbed with randomly sampled noise from a small threat boundary (as a proxy for the adversarial
perturbations). This results in producing the classifiers, fθ(i) with only small changes in their batch-normalization
parameters. Hence, for a given test image, these models produce almost the same loss gradients with respect to
the pixels. As a result, we cannot significantly improve the strength of the adversarial attacks by choosing a
larger m.
F ADDITIONAL RESULTS ON COMMON CORRUPTIONS
In this section, we first present the accuracy attained by different classifiers under different common perturbations.
Next, we visualize the loss gradients of adversarially trained models using adaptive BN technique under different
corruptions from IMAGENET-C dataset.
F.1 PERFORMANCE UNDER DIFFERENT CORRUPTIONS
Hendrycks & Dietterich (2019) introduced IMAGENET-C by algorithmically generated corruptions from noise,
blur, weather, or digital categories with I = 5 different severities for each corruptions. In Table 8, we present











where, f denotes the classifier, k is the corruption type and i is the severity level.
Recall that, we use the top-1 error rate for individual corruptions, normalized using AlexNet error rates to
measure the corruption robustness i.emCE and rmCE scores. Hendrycks & Dietterich (2019) already provided
the performance under different corruptions to compute the mCE and rmCE scores for IMAGENET-C.
We observe that the adversarially trained models, without BN adaptation technique, significantly dropped the
accuracy under corruptions from noise, blur, and weather category for IMAGENET-C, compared to their clean test
accuracy. These models often achieve significantly lower accuracy compared to the Baseline model without BN
adaptation. For example, Adv∞ and Adv2 achieve an average top-1 accuracy of 26.5% and 24.1%, compared to
43.0% for the Baseline model without BN adaptation. However, as we apply BN adaptation, the performance of
Adv∞ and Adv2 is significantly improved by approximately 20% in top-1 accuracy for IMAGENET-C.
F.2 LOSS GRADIENTS UNDER DIFFERENT PERTURBATIONS
Previous studies have shown that the loss gradients for adversarially trained models align properly with perceptu-
ally relevant features for clean images, without the perturbations (Tsipras et al., 2019; Etmann et al., 2019). In
this section, we investigate the loss gradients of these models in presence of random perturbations from different
categories of corruptions.
In Section C, we have already visualized that in presence of high Gaussian noise, adversarially trained models
without BN adaptation produce noisy loss gradients with higher values for the background pixels. The adaptive
BN technique mitigates this effect. However, in Figure 4 we observe that this behavior is not generalized for all
types of random corruptions. Here, we visualize the Fourier spectrum of the corruption images along with the
loss gradients values for Adv∞ model with and without applying BN adaptation techniques 4.
We note that, when the corruption images have a higher concentration for lower Fourier frequencies (called
“low” frequency corruption), the adversarially trained models without BN adaptation tend to produce blurry
loss-gradients (see the first column in Figure 4). In other words, the classifier provides almost uniform importance
to all input pixels to predict these corrupted images. Generally, we observe this pattern for corruption images
from blur and weather categories.
4Please refer to (Yin et al., 2019) (see Figure 2) for more details of Fourier perspective on random corruptions.
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Clean - 56.5±0.0 75.2±0.0 74.4±0.14 62.8±0.0 60.8±0.16 59.8±0.0 58.3±0.08
Noise
Gaussian Noise 11.4±0.0 31.5±0.0 42.0±0.04 24.0±0.0 55.5±0.09 23.4±0.0 54.3±0.01
Shot Noise 10.6±0.0 29.6±0.0 41.0±0.05 22.7±0.0 54.8±0.03 22.9±0.0 54.0±0.09
Impulse Noise 7.7±0.0 26.3±0.0 37.6±0.09 14.6±0.0 53.7±0.03 19.7±0.0 54.5±0.09
Average. 9.9±0.0 29.1±0.0 40.2±0.02 20.4±0.0 54.7±0.04 22.0±0.0 54.3±0.06
Blur
Defocus Blur 18.0±0.0 39.1±0.0 36.3±0.09 23.9±0.0 45.2±0.03 25.2±0.0 45.8±0.01
Glass Blur 17.4±0.0 27.2±0.0 37.4±0.02 33.7±0.0 49.8±0.09 34.1±0.0 49.3±0.04
Motion Blur 21.4±0.0 38.1±0.0 47.9±0.07 33.0±0.0 50.6±0.06 32.9±0.0 49.7±0.03
Zoom Blur 20.2±0.0 35.4±0.0 49.5±0.02 30.3±0.0 50.9±0.03 33.6±0.0 50.3±0.02
Average. 19.3±0.0 35.0±0.0 42.8±0.04 31.2±0.0 49.1±0.02 31.5±0.0 48.8±0.01
Weather
Snow 13.3±0.0 29.3±0.0 43.5±0.07 30.3±0.0 48.4±0.09 25.1±0.0 45.0±0.03
Fog 18.1±0.0 44.1±0.0 58.3±0.03 6.9±0.0 45.2±0.06 6.1±0.0 42.4±0.06
Frost 17.3±0.0 36.4±0.0 44.2±0.05 31.6±0.0 49.5±0.04 28.3±0.0 45.7±0.06
Brightness 43.5±0.0 66.5±0.0 69.8±0.04 54.4±0.0 58.4±0.06 51.4±0.0 55.4±0.05
Contrast 14.7±0.0 38.8±0.0 50.9±0.05 9.1±0.0 43.0±0.05 9.6±0.0 44.0±0.04
Average. 21.4±0.0 43.0±0.0 53.4±0.01 26.5±0.0 48.9±0.04 24.1±0.0 46.5±0.02
Digital
Elastic Transform 35.4±0.0 45.4±0.0 58.9±0.01 48.2±0.0 52.7±0.03 46.5±0.0 50.9±0.05
Pixelate 28.2±0.0 43.8±0.0 61.4±0.06 56.4±0.0 58.6±0.06 54.5±0.0 56.4±0.02
JPEG Compression 39.3±0.0 53.4±0.0 56.7±0.05 59.4±0.0 59.2±0.09 56.1±0.0 56.7±0.05
Average. 34.2±0.0 47.5±0.0 59.0±0.01 54.7±0.0 56.8±0.04 52.4±0.0 54.7±0.03
Hold-out Noise Speckle Noise 15.5±0.0 37.5±0.0 48.2±0.03 30.0±0.0 55.7±0.04 30.1±0.0 54.9±0.03
Hold-out Blur Gaussian Blur 21.3±0.0 42.7±0.0 40.2±0.03 27.7±0.0 47.1±0.08 28.4±0.0 47.1±0.04
Hold-out Weather Spatter 28.2±0.0 48.3±0.0 55.0±0.11 44.1±0.0 51.9±0.05 43.1±0.0 51.0±0.05
Hold-out Digital Saturate 34.2±0.0 61.0±0.0 67.8±0.03 48.1±0.0 56.4±0.04 43.9±0.0 54.6±0.03
Table 8: IMAGENET-C: Top-1 Accuracy achieved by different classification models under each
individual corruption. For models with BN adaptation, we randomly shuffle the test images to report
(mean+ 2× sd) of 3 different runs.
In contrast, for corruption images with larger concentration for higher Fourier frequencies, adversarially
trained models without BN adaptation produces sharper loss-gradients. As the concentration for higher Fourier
frequencies increases, it produces high loss-gradient values even for back-ground pixels (see the third column in
Figure 4). As a consequence, the loss-gradients become noisy, obfuscating the pixels from object-of-interest. We
observe this pattern for corruption images from the noisy category.
Finally, we can see that the adaptive BN technique mitigates the blurry patterns for corruption images from
blur and weather categories as well as the noisy patterns for the corruption images from the noise category. In
other words, it mitigates the effect of any random corruption to restore the alignment with perceptually relevant
features. This allows the adversarially trained models to produce significantly higher Top-1 classification
accuracy for random corruptions (Table 8).
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Figure 4: Corruption images with a higher concentration of Fourier frequencies produce blurry
loss-gradients, while, corruption images with a lower concentration of Fourier frequencies lead to
noisy loss-gradient patterns. Adaptive BN significantly adaptive BN technique mitigates these effects
to restore the perceptual alignment.
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